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We have all visited several stores to check prices and/or to ﬁnd the right item 
or the right size. Similarly, it can take time and effort for a worker to ﬁnd 
a suitable job with suitable pay and for employers to receive and evaluate   
applications for job openings. Search theory explores the workings of   
markets once facts such as these are incorporated into the analysis. Adequate 
analysis of market frictions needs to consider how reactions to frictions 
change the overall economic environment: not only do frictions change   
incentives for buyers and sellers, but the responses to the changed incentives 
also alter the economic environment for all the participants in the market. 
Because of these feedback effects, seemingly small frictions can have large 
effects on outcomes.
Equilibrium search theory is the development of basic models to permit 
analysis of economic outcomes when speciﬁc frictions are incorporated into 
simpler market models. The primary friction addressed by search theory is the 
need to spend time and effort to learn about opportunities – opportunities 
to buy or to sell, to hire or to be hired. There are many aspects of a job and 
of a worker that matter when deciding whether a particular match is worth-
while. Such frictions are naturally analyzed in models that consider a process 
over time – of workers seeking jobs, ﬁrms seeking employees, borrowers   
seeking lenders, and shoppers buying items that are not part of frequent 
shopping. Search theory models have altered the way we think about 
markets, how we interpret market data and how we think about government 
policies. 
The complexity of the economy calls for the use of multiple models that 
address different aspects of the determinants of unemployment (and other) 
outcomes. This view was captured so well by Alfred Marshall (1920: 1948 
edition, page 366) that I have quoted this passage repeatedly since coming 
upon it while doing research for the Churchill Lectures (Diamond, 1994b).
The element of time  is a chief cause of those difﬁculties  in economic  
investigations which make it necessary for man with his limited powers to 
go step by step; breaking up a complex question, studying one bit at a time, 
and at last combining his partial solutions into a more or less complete solu-
tion of the whole riddle. … The more the issue is thus narrowed, the more 
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exactly can it be handled: but also the less closely does it correspond to real 
life. Each exact and ﬁrm handling of a narrow issue, however, helps towards 
treating broader issues,  in which that narrow issue  is contained, more  
exactly than would otherwise have been possible. With each step… exact 
discussions can be made less abstract, realistic discussions can be made less 
inexact than was possible at an earlier stage. 
This passage is particularly suitable here since the heart of the difference 
between standard demand-supply analysis and search theory lies  in the 
treatment of time – the use of time as well as resources to learn about   
opportunities. I am concerned that, in contrast with Marshall’s view, too 
many economists take the ﬁndings of individual studies literally as a basis 
for policy thinking, rather than drawing inferences from an individual study, 
combining them with  inferences from other studies that consider other 
aspects of a policy question, as well as with intuitions about aspects of policy 
that have not been formally modeled. Assumptions that are satisfactory for 
basic research, for clarifying an issue by isolating it from other effects, should 
not play a central role in policy recommendations if those assumptions do 
not apply to the world. To me, taking a model literally is not taking a model 
seriously. It is worth remembering that models are incomplete – indeed that 
is what it means to be a model. 
This essay is not a survey of uses of search theory in analyzing many labor 
market questions or questions in other markets.2 Instead, it explores a few 
of the contributions of search theory, focusing primarily on early work that 
marked the break from analyzing equilibrium  in markets to analyzing 
equilibrium in a search setting. Although the focus is on the labor market, 
the discussion starts with a retail market example, followed by discussions 
of labor market ﬂows, aggregate demand, and the Beveridge Curve, which 
shows unemployment and vacancy rates for the economy. Considerable   
attention has been given to possible policy implications of the recent evolu-
tion of the Beveridge Curve, during what has been called the Great Recession 
and the Long Slump. I add to this ongoing debate from a search perspective.
I. A RETAIL MARKET EXAMPLE
Economics education starts with the abstraction of an ideal market –   
demand, supply, and a price that clears the market. That is an extremely 
valuable starting place – it shows some of the effects that are present in 
pretty much all markets. And, since such ideal markets can achieve efﬁcient 
outcomes, it helps us understand the sources of inefﬁciencies that can occur 
when market structures differ from the idealized version. In the simple market 
abstraction, each buyer knows how to purchase at the lowest price available 
in the market. As a result, each ﬁrm faces a discontinuity in sales when the 
price varies from the lowest price elsewhere and the “law of one price” holds 
– all transactions happen at the same price, which is the competitive price, 
equal to the marginal cost of providing the good. 
To analyze a search setting, the ﬁrst step is to consider how individuals 
Diamond_lect.indd   3 2011-08-29   10:45:00314
approach both the search process and the ensuing purchase or sale decision. 
And that is where the literature started. But a full analysis needs to combine 
individual decision-making with an analysis of how the interactions of buyers 
and sellers determine the economic environment in which these decisions 
are made.3 
Consider the simplest standard model, a retail market for a standardized 
good with a large number of identical buyers and a large number of identical 
sellers. My 1971 paper alters this model by assuming that the only way to ﬁnd 
out a price is by visiting a store and that stores are visited randomly. Then, 
visiting another store to get a second price quote has a cost. That implies that 
the ﬁrst store you happen to visit has a little bit of market power over the 
other stores. Surprisingly, in this uniform setting, these little bits of market 
power interact so that all ﬁrms want to charge the price a monopolist would 
set. If the price were lower and the same in every store, then each store would 
want to make a small price increase to take advantage of its little bit of market 
power.4 So the only way to have equilibrium, where no store has an incentive 
to change price, is when the monopoly price is set. Notice that it does not 
matter how small is the cost of visiting another store – any positive cost gives 
the same result. Technically, there is a discontinuity in the equilibrium price 
as the cost of search hits zero. 
My description of this example reﬂects an equilibrium approach similar to 
the approach of a standard competitive equilibrium–equilibrium in Arrow-
Debreu theory is a set of conditions on an allocation of resources such that 
no price-taker would want to change behavior from what is consistent with 
that allocation. However, this description does not reﬂect how I came to my 
1971 paper, nor how I presented the analysis. The process that led to this, 
my ﬁrst search paper, began in 1969, while I was visiting Hebrew University, 
Jerusalem, and then Nufﬁeld College, Oxford (rounding out 15 months of 
leave that started at University College, Nairobi). 
Arrow-Debreu theory does not contain a mechanism or process for an 
economy to achieve its equilibrium allocation. In the 1960s there was ongoing 
work to ﬁnd a hypothetical process that would converge to this equilibrium, 
with a focus on equations for price adjustment based on excess demands and 
supplies at tentative prices (referred to as tâtonnement). It struck me that 
the wrong question was being asked. Rather than asking whether a process 
could be found that would converge to a standard competitive equilibrium, I 
chose to work on the question of ﬁnding the allocation to which a plausible 
process would converge. The research approach was a dynamic overlap-
ping generations model, which presented conditions under which the 
(uniform) prices of identical ﬁrms converged to the monopoly price in ﬁnite 
time. Paying attention to a dynamic process, and not just conditions for a   
stationary equilibrium, was a central part of my research strategy. To my 
surprise, I found the monopoly pricing equilibrium, about as far from a   
competitive equilibrium as one could be.5 With monopoly prices, equilib-
rium is not efﬁcient even with the search frictions taken into account.
This model was not meant to be a realistic model of price determination, 
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but an exploration of how important search frictions could be – and they 
were found to be very important, even when the search costs were small. 
This result highlights one of the central aspects of economics. Economists 
study the nature of equilibrium, reﬂecting the interactions among buyers 
and sellers. Small search costs can have a large impact because price setters 
respond to the prices set by others, so there is a feedback process that greatly 
expands the impact of search costs – as each ﬁrm reacts both to the presence 
of the search costs of potential customers and also to the responses of other 
suppliers to the same search costs. That a small amount of friction could 
create a large change, even in such an unrealistic setting, served as a marker 
of the importance of the study of equilibrium with frictions.
Of course, this extreme result is dependent on a number of special and 
unrealistic assumptions. But the point of the analysis was to open up a ﬁeld 
of study, not to zero in on a particular market. Later work, by a number of 
economists, explored models with more realistic assumptions. Two ﬁndings 
of this literature are to expect a variety of prices for identical commodities 
and that pretty much all the prices will exceed the marginal cost of providing 
the good. Models show these results when they incorporate variation in the 
demand curves of different buyers, variation in the costs of different sellers, 
mixed strategies being followed by homogeneous sellers, or more complex 
methods of becoming informed about prices.6 With richer modeling, the 
level of prices does depend on the size of search costs.7 
A price per unit set by a seller has two roles: affecting the number of 
customers who buy and affecting the average quantity purchased by those 
who do buy – the extensive and intensive margins. In the simple setting   
originally analyzed, search frictions imply that the extensive margin (affecting  
the number of purchasing customers) plays no role in equilibrium price   
setting, resulting in the equilibrium price being the one that optimizes rela-
tive to the intensive margin (average sales per buying customer). In contrast, 
thought of as a price-setting (Bertrand) equilibrium, standard competitive 
market theory gives full weight to the extensive margin and none to the 
intensive margin.
After my return from 15 months abroad, I learned that search ideas were 
very much in the air from the publication of the Phelps volume (1970), 
written while I was away. It is no surprise when many researchers are thinking 
along parallel lines, although I came to search from general equilibrium 
theory, while the Phelps volume had an unemployment focus. The process of 
going from my start on search equilibrium to my writings on the labor mar-
ket (1981, 1982a) and on the entire economy (1982b, 1984) had two phases. 
The ﬁrst phase was an exercise  in brain rewiring. As an undergraduate, 
in the spring of 1960, I studied general equilibrium theory with Gerard 
Debreu, when his  Theory of Value (1959) was new. Gerard was an out- 
standing teacher, and I became well-grounded in the theory, so much so that 
it became the starting place for my thinking about allocation questions. But it 
was not a good starting place for thinking about search issues. Nevertheless, 
I found my mind running down that path as I attempted to ﬁnd a different 
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way to approach questions. In order to free up my thinking process, I pressed 
myself to explore a question which could not possibly be answered within 
the Arrow-Debreu framework.8 This resulted in a little noticed, read or cited 
1978 paper and greater ease in creating models. 
The second phase was writing a pair of papers with Eric Maskin (1979, 
1981), considering search equilibria in a setting of pairwise contracting, with 
a focus on a law and economics question – the role of damage payments 
for breach of contract. For a contracting paper, it was natural to consider 
a bargained price rather than one set by one party, as in the retail market 
paper. Thus the focus had shifted from the price outcome to the efﬁciency of 
the search-and-matching process.9 We assumed equal splitting of the surplus 
from signing a contract. These papers drew on a contracting paper by Dale 
T. Mortensen (1978) that helped me realize the power of Poisson processes 
as modeling tools. After this work, I was ready to work on models focused 
directly on the labor market and on the entire economy. In this work, I 
continued with the assumption of a negotiated wage rather than one set on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis as in the retail model above. To set the framework for 
later discussion, I begin with a review of some data on market ﬂows.
II. LABOR MARKET FLOWS
At any time, a modern economy has both unemployed workers and posted 
vacancies. Thinking about this fact in a static setting might lead one to think 
there is a serious mismatch between the workers and the jobs, in skills or in 
location, for example. Or it might lead one to think that the primary problem 
is that wages are not at the right levels to clear the markets, referred to as 
“sticky wages” s ince wages are not changing adequately as circumstances 
change. A search perspective puts these two ideas  into a richer, more   
informative context. That is, the quality of matches between workers and 
jobs matters, and limited rates of wage change matter, but understanding the   
extent and effect of these two issues is best done in a search setting. 
I start by considering the monthly CPS Household Survey. At the time 
of their interviews, workers are classiﬁed into three categories – employed,   
unemployed and out-of-the-labor force. A month later many of the workers who 
were unemployed will have found jobs. And many people who were classiﬁed 
as out-of-the-labor force also will have found jobs. Of those employed in the 
earlier month, most will still be in the same job, but many will have left their 
previous jobs, some voluntarily and some not, some to new jobs and some to 
unemployment or to a departure from the measured labor force. Indeed, the 
ﬂow of workers directly from one job to another is large and is an important 
part of the efﬁciency of the labor market. On average, 2.6 percent of the 
employed have a different employer a month later – there are more hires 
from the employed than the unemployed.10 
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For someone to be deﬁned as being unemployed, he or she must be 
actively trying to ﬁnd a job – not just being without a job and wishing for 
one. Many people labeled as being out-of-the-labor force are in fact available 
for employment, and many of them do ﬁnd jobs. Figure 1 shows the average 
monthly ﬂow rates in the U.S. over the last 20 years. On average, 37 percent 
of the unemployed were employed as of the following month (labeled UE in 
Figure 1). Almost as large a fraction, 33 percent, left unemployment by leav-
ing the measured labor force, labeled UI, with I for inactive. Similarly, those 
who were inactive ﬂow into both employment and unemployment (IE and 
IU). And the employed ﬂow into unemployment and also outside the labor 
force (EU and EI). On average over this 20-year period, roughly 6 million 
workers moved into employment each month and roughly the same number 
moved out of employment. The large differences in the rates of ﬂow in the 
chart reﬂect the much smaller number of unemployed than of employed or 
of inactives. 
Each of the rates in the ﬁgure is an average for all the individuals in the 
category, with the rates varying greatly across groups, whether measured by 
characteristics, such as education, race and gender, or by the duration of the 
unemployment spell. Thus there is not a stationary stock of unemployed, but 
a steadily shifting set of workers, with large ﬂows both in and out but with 
some people staying unemployed for a long time.
 








UE UI IE  IU  EU  EI 
Figure 1. Monthly Worker Flow Rates 1990:2–2009:4 (as a percent of workers with initial sta-
tus) Data constructed by Robert Shimer. For additional details, please see Shimer (2007) 
and his webpage.
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The U.S. economy is an outlier, having larger labor market ﬂow rates than 
other advanced economies, although ﬂow rates are substantial elsewhere 
as well. Figure 2 shows monthly ﬂow rates into and out of unemployment 
that have been estimated by Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and AyúegĦl ùahin 
(2008) using OECD data.11 The calculation of these ﬁgures examined the 
ﬂows to and from being unemployed, and did not distinguish between the 
employed and those outside the labor force. The rates are much higher in 
the U.S. than elsewhere, and only a portion of the differences comes from 
the larger fractions  involved  in movements to and from out-of-the-labor 
force.12 The difference in ﬂows is, in part, a reﬂection of government policies 
that affect hiring and ﬁring, a subject that has received considerable atten-
tion. And the resulting level of job availability affects the willingness to seek 
new employment.
Figure 2. Average Monthly In- and Outﬂow Rates across Countries. Source: Michael Elsby, 
Bart Hobijn, and AyúegĦl ùahin “Unemployment Dynamics in the OECD”, NBER working 
paper number 14617, Figure 1.
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Turning to a perspective from data on employers, Figure 3 draws on the 
extensive pioneering work of Davis and Haltiwanger and co-authors. In a 
typical quarter, many ﬁrms are increasing employment while others are 
decreasing it. On average over the last 20 years, additional employment at 
growing and new ﬁrms, labeled job creation, was 7.5 percent of employment, 
with job destruction almost as large. This is another view of the way that the 
change in employment is a result of the netting of large gross ﬂows. Hires 
and separations are roughly twice as large as job creation and destruction, as 
workers leave and ﬁrms replace them. Note that of workers leaving there are 
roughly equal numbers of quits and layoffs on average. However, the relative 
sizes vary greatly over the course of the business cycle – at a time when layoffs 
rise, quits drop as the ability to land a new job also drops. 
Search theory is designed to help make sense of these ﬂows and to frame 
analysis of related government policies such as unemployment beneﬁts. 
Considering “ordinary” times, captured by a rational expectations model set 
in a steady state, a primary purpose of unemployment beneﬁts is to provide 
insurance to workers against involuntary job loss.13 The provision of insur-
ance affects the willingness of workers to accept particular jobs, making it 
more attractive to pass up some opportunities in expectation of doing better 
later. And it affects the diligence of job search. This is always the case with 
insurance with asymmetric information – the provision of insurance affects 
behavior, commonly referred to as a moral hazard problem. Of course there 
are behavioral changes that reﬂect income effects and can have a positive 
efﬁciency implication as well as those that reﬂect substitution effects and can 
have a negative efﬁciency implication. The negative effects do not mean one 
should not have insurance, but that the strength and design of the insurance 
should take into account the behavioral responses it induces.14 
Less diligent search and greater willingness to wait for a future job make it 
harder for employers to ﬁnd workers but easier for other workers to ﬁnd jobs. 
Figure 3. Quarterly Job and Worker Flow Rates for the U.S. Private Sector 1990:2–2009:4 
(as a percent of employment). Notes: Series drawn from methodology used in Davis, 
Faberman and Haltiwanger (2010), “Labor Market Flows in the Cross Section and Over 
Time”. Series measured from Business Employment Dynamics (BED) and Job Openings 
and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). Pre-2001:3 Hires, Separations, Layoffs and Quits are 
Model Based Estimates. 
Source: John Haltiwanger, personal communication.
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The relative importance of these positive and negative feedback effects will 
vary with the large swings in the vacancy-unemployment ratio that happen 
over the business cycle, so the impact will be different at different times – at 
times of high unemployment, a little less search by some workers will not 
have much impact on the difﬁculty of ﬁlling vacancies and so will have 
little effect on total unemployment. These effects on workers and ﬁrms are   
externalities, affecting people with whom there are no direct transactions 
that might counter the effect. Thus, the “natural rate of unemployment,” 
coming from adding labor market frictions to a standard competitive model, 
is not generally an efﬁcient level of unemployment.15 That is, having a worker 
search less and be more choosy about job acceptance as a result of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts, may raise or lower efﬁciency in the labor market. One cannot 
assume that the no-beneﬁt levels of search and job acceptance would be   
efﬁcient,  in contrast with the usual assumption when considering moral 
hazard issues in insurance analyses for ordinary goods without externalities. 
By contrasting the experiences of workers having access to more or 
less generous unemployment insurance coverages, such as extensions of 
coverage during recessions, one can estimate how the average duration of 
unemployment of covered workers varies cross-sectionally with details of 
insurance provision. However, by itself, this does not provide an estimate of 
the impact of unemployment insurance (or an extension of the period of 
beneﬁts) on total unemployment. Because of the externalities, looking only 
at the change in effort to become employed does not provide an estimate 
of the equilibrium impact of unemployment insurance on total unemploy-
ment. Such an approach would be tantamount to assuming that employment 
equals labor supply. That is, it ignores the impact of less diligent search 
on the ability of others to ﬁnd jobs and on the creation of vacancies. This 
is clearly incomplete. Equating employment to labor supply is an amusing   
contrast to traditional Keynesian analyses that assume that employment 
equals labor demand. These can’t both be right. And from a search theory 
perspective, neither is – the matching function, discussed below, gives the 
change in hiring from changes in the number of workers seeking jobs and 
the number of vacancies seeking workers; it depends on both demand and 
supply. 
In addition, the presence of unemployment beneﬁts and the induced 
changes in the ﬂows of hires, layoffs and quits affect the level of compensa-
tion. Whether modeled as a bargained wage or a wage set on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, the availability of workers and jobs will affect the determination 
of compensation. And that will affect the decisions of employers and workers 
as to the willingness to create jobs, to stay in the labor force and to seek a 
better match. All of these issues are naturally approached through an equi-
librium search model. 
While insights have come from models with ex ante homogeneity of both 
jobs and workers, a central element in the labor market is that workers and 
jobs vary greatly. And the extent to which a given worker is a good ﬁt for a 
particular job not only varies but may take time and expense to determine, 
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especially as some worker training, sometimes a great deal of training, is 
generally needed for a worker to do well at a job. Thus, a hiring decision is 
a form of investment, just as is the acquisition of plant and equipment. Both 
workers and ﬁrms need to have views as to the value of future alternatives. 
The worker needs to be concerned about how long the job might last and 
what alternative jobs might be found. The ﬁrm needs to be concerned about 
the future value of the services that will be provided by the worker and what 
alternative workers might become available. All of these depend on what 
other ﬁrms and workers will do and how well the economy will do. 
With heterogeneity of both workers and jobs, there is a “matching 
problem” that affects the efﬁciency of the economy. Search theory helps 
us to make sense of this complex environment. It has been natural to focus 
on rational expectations to isolate the impact of search per se on resource 
allocation. But modeling only with rational expectations is incomplete in not 
recognizing the heterogeneity in expectations that is always present (e.g., 
Johannes Spinnewijn, 2009, 2010). Also, it does not apply well to circum-
stances, as at present, of a recession deeper than any experienced in many 
decades, which makes extrapolation from past recessions an incomplete 
foundation for expectations.
A key shortcut that makes search analyses tractable is the “matching   
function.”16 For theoretical work the matching function gives the rate of 
meetings of workers and ﬁrms in the process of seeking employment as 
a function of the numbers of searching workers and job vacancies. The 
theory combines this with analysis of which meetings result in new hires.17 
Empirically, we do not have information on meetings, but on hiring. The 
same term, the matching function, is used for the empirical relationship   
relating hires to the numbers of unemployed and vacancies. From the 
context, I don’t think there is much risk of confusion from the different 
meanings for “matching” of meeting and hiring. The matching function 
plays a similar role in search analyses as does the aggregate production   
function  in growth theory. Empirically, for the economy as a whole, the 
matching function appears to have constant returns to scale. 
The matching function  is not solely technologically driven, but the 
outcome of a process reﬂecting the ways in which hiring occurs, which 
vary greatly across the economy. The simplest model has workers and jobs   
meeting one-to-one, although urn-ball models18 are also used to examine 
some implications of multiple applicants for particular jobs. And the presence 
of ﬁrms with multiple vacancies matters for the matching process. Some 
of these issues will be mentioned again in the discussion of the Beveridge 
Curve.
III. AGGREGATE DEMAND
Basic search analyses of the labor market for “normal times” proceed by   
taking the value of a worker to a ﬁrm as given primarily by technology; and 
the value to a worker of being without a job as given by preferences (and 
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unemployment  insurance). This  is partial equilibrium modeling, leaving 
out the role of the output market. As a method of capturing labor market 
outcomes around turning points  in the business cycle, Christopher A. 
Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) have advanced the 
analysis by examining the dynamics of an economy when these exogenous 
values shift. This is an important step forward, a way of examining the labor 
market around turning points. However, that still leaves the critical task of   
endogenizing the assumed values of production and the assumed costs of 
lack of work. That task is particularly important for times of high unemploy-
ment. 
While commonly referred to both as changes in the “value of output” 
and as shocks to “productivity,” the broad range of changes around turning 
points is supportive of an aggregate demand interpretation (Blanchard and 
Diamond, 1989). While the term “productivity” may be useful metaphoric 
shorthand, we should not think that output per worker provides a reasonable 
measure of the value of additional output for business cycle analysis. With a 
Walrasian output market, productivity does measure the value of output, but 
with a search model of the output market, and so a limited ability to make 
sales, productivity is not necessarily a good measure of the value of output. 
In other words, a labor market model is a partial equilibrium model, not a 
general equilibrium model. As such it can shed light on partial equilibrium 
questions and partial equilibrium aspects of general equilibrium issues, but 
can not, by itself, fully evaluate general equilibrium questions, such as the 
role of aggregate demand stimulation. There are multiple ways of combining 
a search model of the labor market with a model of the output market. Both 
positive and normative evaluations of interventions in the labor market, such 
as the considerable extension of unemployment beneﬁts during the last few 
years, can vary critically with how the output market is modeled as well as 
how the labor market is modeled. Combining a frictional labor market with 
a Walrasian output market seems likely to miss some important links that   
matter for policy design for extended periods of high unemployment. 
Looking only at output per worker is thus an inadequate measure of the 
value of an additional hire. While the bulk of search analyses have focused on 
the labor market per se, search also has been used to see how the presence of 
frictions affects the aggregate economy. 
Complete-market Arrow-Debreu theory has coordination of production 
decisions and purchase decisions by having all prices and quantities settled 
ahead of time. While there is considerable production after contracts are 
signed for delivery of the output, overwhelmingly, ﬁrms make investment 
and production decisions in anticipation of future sales without contact with 
potential future customers, suggesting a possibly signiﬁcant role for search 
theory.19 The Arrow-Debreu model conditions household demands on 
lifetime budget constraints. But current income plays a much larger role in 
consumption decisions at business cycle frequencies than is consistent with 
the market structure in the Arrow-Debreu model (Orazio P. Attanasio and 
Gugliermo Weber, 2010).20 
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Keynesian theory gives important roles to both sticky wages and contem-
poraneous  income. Some New Keynesian analyses consider sticky prices 
and wages without a signiﬁcant role for contemporaneous income by using   
inﬁnite-horizon budget constraints for consumption demand (e. g., 
Blanchard and Galí, 2010). My research hunch when starting on this model 
was that sticky wages were only one source of macro difﬁculties. I thought 
that search frictions in the output market opened a way to capture the macro 
role of contemporaneous purchasing power as a complementary basis for   
analyzing unemployment, which would then also clarify the role of sticky 
wages. That is, my choices for modeling the entire economy (and not just 
the labor market) came from a belief in the incompleteness of some macro, 
Keynesian, sticky-wage analyses, which was to be demonstrated by similar 
properties in a model with no wage or price stickiness – with the comple-
tion of all mutually advantageous trades that the parties were aware of. The 
approach was not meant to remove sticky wages from the consideration of 
unemployment, but by considering a model without sticky wages to make 
the point that sticky wages were not the sole basis for macro problems. 
While I started working on search theory out of dissatisfaction with general 
equilibrium theory, I gravitated to seeing search also as a way to address 
my dissatisfactions with macro theory. My dissatisfaction did not relate to 
basic Keynesian concepts, but to the nature of modeling. I wanted to see a 
microfoundation that would enhance the ability to do normative analysis and 
to develop policy insights.
A. Multiple Equilibria Without Sticky Wages
The complexity of addressing frictions in both output and labor markets 
makes it difﬁcult to address both in a single model. So, my 1982b paper 
on the role of aggregate demand suppressed a role for the labor market by   
assuming only self-employment. This approach was based on a presumption 
that a model with a distinct labor market would have similar properties in 
the output market – that production contributes to demand, whether its pro-
ceeds are owned by a self-employed worker or divided between a worker and 
an employer. Frictions arise from lags between a production decision and a 
potential sale, reﬂecting both the time of production and the time to sell. 
Since time to sell was the key endogenous variable, the variable reﬂecting 
the state of aggregate demand, I left out time to produce, making that   
instantaneous. To capture the need to trade produced goods I assumed that 
individuals could not consume what they produced, but must barter output 
with another producer. Thus production provides purchasing power. As a 
barter model without credit, this overplays the importance of contemporane-
ous purchasing power in order to clarify its role.21 Since all producers with 
something to sell were assumed to be in the same setting, all trade would be 
one-for-one and no potentially mutually advantageous trade would be passed 
up.22 
Assuming that trade is quicker with more potential trading partners, higher 
total production (implying more people with purchasing power) shortens 
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expected sale time and there is an external economy with positive feedback. 
That is, when others are producing little, the ability to sell is low, and so the 
incentive to produce is low. When others are producing much, the incentive 
to produce is high. The goal was to capture an effect of the availability of 
more purchasing power on equilibrium, not particularly the frictions in an 
actual shopping process. That is, search modeling would capture the impact 
of the difﬁculty of selling when aggregate incomes were low.
This externality  implies that the equilibrium level of production  is   
inefﬁciently low. The positive feedback opens up the possibility of multiple 
equilibria. And with multiple equilibria, the economy can trace out what 
would resemble a business cycle (Diamond and Fudenberg, 1989) and 
there is a role for government policy to affect aggregate demand. Key to 
the multiple equilibria result is an assumption of increasing returns in the 
combination of production and sales, not particularly in the labor market. 
Thus, it is not appropriate to reject the importance of multiple equilibria 
based solely on the typical ﬁnding of constant returns of the aggregate 
matching function in the labor market, since that ignores the output market. 
It is hard to think of what would be a comparable directly informative empiri-
cal analysis of returns to scale of the full production and sales process. One 
place to look would be the gap version of Okun’s law, which has historically 
seen measured productivity rising as the gap closes. That is, when aggregate 
demand increases at a time of high unemployment, the percentage increase 
in output exceeds that in employment, a form of increasing returns. 
Government policies, like unemployment insurance, affect the workings of 
the labor market in normal economic times and in times of high unemploy-
ment.23 The distinction matters because the ratio of vacancies to unemploy-
ment, v/u, is different at different times and because of the role of insurance 
in supporting aggregate demand at times of high unemployment. While 
policies can be modiﬁed for times of high unemployment, automatically or 
by new legislation, it is still useful to consider diverse circumstances when 
setting general policies – their effects will come into play more quickly than 
triggered changes or legislated ones. That is, modeling policies that apply 
to a range of diverse states of nature should be able to improve some policy 
analysis. 
Of course a model with multiple equilibria  is an incomplete model. 
Whatever determines which equilibrium occurs is simply outside what is 
being modeled. In the model, coordinated expectations select the equi-
librium, and poor outcomes have been dubbed a “coordination failure.” 
Actual expectations don’t get fully coordinated, but the distribution of 
expectations, proxied perhaps by the degree of conﬁdence about the future 
of the economy, is critical for the economy and ﬁts with the insights of this 
modeling. Conﬁdence about the future is primarily conﬁdence about the 
behavior of others and so reﬂects coordination issues.
A model with multiple equilibria can be used as a starting place in different 
ways, depending on how the missing elements are ﬁlled in. One approach 
is through sunspot equilibria, with the economy coordinating on different 
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equilibrium structures for no real reason. While useful for understanding 
the potentials in a model, this does not seem to me a sound way to think 
about addressing the incompleteness  inherent  in multiple equilibria. 
Rather, I see two potentially useful approaches. One is to incorporate an 
empirically based evolution of the distribution of expectations. Another is 
to recognize potentially large responses to shocks by considering alternative 
rational expectations equilibria, rather than modeling the development of 
expectations as the economic environment (slowly) changes. While history 
is a prime ingredient in considering how the economy will go forward from 
a given position, it is not the case that we can draw on sufﬁcient data to view 
parameters (or outcomes) of the economy as following a stochastic process 
that can be reasonably well estimated. Hence the basic  insufﬁciency, by 
themselves, of rational expectations analyses. Each circumstance is somewhat   
different in detail from similar episodes in the past, and some, like the current 
circumstances, considerably so.24 
B. Sticky Wages
As noted above, my 1982b paper expressly omitted any role for sticky prices 
or wages to isolate a role for search frictions  in the output market. Yet 
wages on most jobs are sticky – they are adjusted infrequently and so do not   
respond quickly to changing demand and supply conditions.25 Little use is 
made of wages that are conditional on aggregate data, with the exception of 
inﬂation indexing in economies with a history of high inﬂation. And I ﬁnd 
Truman Bewley (1999) convincing that layoffs are often used rather than 
wage renegotiations or reductions in hours – such layoffs are consistent with 
a spike in layoffs early in a recession. With my continuing belief in the impor-
tance of sticky wages, I turn to that subject.
Starting from the standard demand-supply, price-clears-the-market 
framework, a natural step for considering unemployment is to have a wage 
that does not clear the market, one that does not adjust adequately and so 
can be too high, a sticky wage. This results in workers who are willing to start 
employment at the going wage, but unable to do so. Much literature has 
been devoted to analyzing market models where prices and/or wages do not 
adjust at a rate sufﬁcient to continuously clear markets. In addition, there 
has been considerable attention to issues that arise in making efﬁcient use of   
current employees and how that affects both layoffs and compensation for 
new hires. Efﬁciency-wage and insider-outsider models recognize the impor-
tant link between intensive and extensive margins for employment – between 
making efﬁcient use of the current labor force and changing the number of 
employees. 
Consideration of wages in a search setting is more complicated than the 
simplest demand-supply approach, reﬂecting two issues – ﬁrst, that hiring 
is the start of a multi-period relationship and second, that an explicitly   
modeled search-matching-bargaining process inﬂuences wages. The standard 
basic model assumes that a decision to begin an employment relationship is 
based on an (implicit?) agreement for the indeﬁnite future. It assumes that 
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subjective probabilities are the same for worker and ﬁrm and that there is 
no asymmetric information during the ongoing relationship – both sides 
anticipate the same (stochastic) future and both sides recognize the same 
reality as it occurs. It assumes that all later decisions are consistent with this 
shared expectation – there are no individual actions that violate the common 
expectations and there are no surprises, such as a state of nature that was not 
anticipated or not covered in the initial agreement because of limits in the 
complexity of changes that are incorporated and the extent of renegotiation. 
Since both sides are risk neutral and have the same discount rate, the 
actual trajectory of the ﬂow of compensation is not determined, as long 
the expected present discounted value is at the right level. The level of 
the expected present discounted value of compensation satisﬁes the Nash   
bargaining solution with threat points of not completing the match (returning 
to the states of unemployed and vacant), and with some assumed parameter 
for relative shares in the Nash bargaining division of the surplus from 
starting production. This condition is how the search-matching-bargaining 
process inﬂuences wages. Wage determination affects the value of creating 
a new vacancy, which equals zero with free entry and identical potential new 
vacancies (a horizontal supply). Of the many conditional wage paths that are 
consistent with the Nash bargaining rule, it is common to analyze the one 
that is equivalent to continuously renegotiated wages (satisfying the Nash 
bargaining condition with the same structure) and a speciﬁed stochastic 
process for the value of output and so the timing of the related ending of the 
employment relation. There are assumed to be no feedback effects on the 
economy from the decision to start employment or from the timing of the 
payment of wages. 
The standard model has the simpliﬁcation that each ﬁrm has at most a   
single vacancy, so there is no tension between the intensive and extensive   
margins and no distinction between average and marginal products of a 
worker. The efﬁciency assumed in the expectation about future employment 
includes only actions that are jointly optimal – no quits or layoffs that are 
not an improvement for the two parties together (a concern examined in 
Mortensen, 1978). This latter condition is where sticky wages, in the traditional 
sense, is ruled out as part of the basic model. 
Given this structure, if one picks a data set for the value of output   
(and other key variables) one can compare the ratio of vacancies to   
unemployment (v/u) in a calibrated model with historic data. This is what 
Robert Shimer (2005) does. His conclusion that the model shows too little 
variation in v/u set off a ﬂurry of activity. Responses include reexamining 
the calibrations (Marcus Hagedorn and Iourii Manovskii, 2008, Mortensen 
and Éva Nagypál, 2007 and the papers cited there), exploring alternative 
bargaining solutions with an eye on having a less variable wage (Hall,   
2005, Hall and Paul R. Milgrom, 2008, Shimer, 2004) and staggered rene-
gotiation with the current wage applying to new hires as well as the current 
labor force (Mortensen and Nagypál, 2007, Mark Gertler and Antonella 
Trigari, 2009). Without getting into the details of this lively literature, I want 
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to make a few methodological points about thinking through the lens of 
these models.
Shimer’s calibration uses output per worker for the marginal value of 
output. With a Walrasian output market and one-worker ﬁrms, this approach 
makes sense. Recognizing larger ﬁrms calls for distinguishing between average 
and marginal products. A change to a monopolistic competitive output 
market would give similar dynamics if there were no systematic pattern to 
the elasticity of demand over the business cycle, but not otherwise. However, 
with a different approach to modeling both the ability to sell and the price 
in the event of a sale, the marginal value of output could be quite different. 
As an extreme alternative, consider my 1971 model of a retail market 
described above. If the shock is to the number of customers shopping, but 
not the demand curve of those who do shop, then an integrated producer-
retailer will not change the retail price, and with no change in the technology   
being used, will want to produce less, and will still have the same measured   
productivity. While the value to the employer of the marginal unit produced 
would not change, there would be layoffs of extra-marginal workers for whom 
the value of output is zero if there are no storage possibilities. While this 
model is extreme, I think it is not adequate to use productivity as a measure 
of the marginal value of output. Shimer’s analysis rejects the match to the 
data of the calibration using the combination of assumptions employed; the 
follow-up literature has explored which one or ones are suspect.
Search frictions in the standard model imply that there is a surplus to be 
divided. Thus, Shimer (2004, 2005) and Hall (2005) note that a deviation 
from Nash bargaining could select a different level of compensation that is 
within the range where both prospective employer and prospective employee 
are willing to make a match. Such a different bargaining solution would   
imply that no pairwise efﬁcient match was passed up (or existing efﬁcient 
match terminated), a condition Shimer and Hall want to meet. Such a 
changed wage rule could result in a wage that is less sensitive to productivity 
than the Nash solution, and so would be one way to make the calibration ﬁt 
the data better. The lower sensitivity to productivity changes than the Nash 
solution has been taken as a deﬁnition of a sticky wage. By affecting the 
compensation of new hires as well as current employees, an altered wage   
bargaining rule can affect the value of creating a vacancy, even though it does 
not directly affect the willingness of a given match to result in a new hire. 
In the discussion of alternative bargaining rules, there appears to be 
wide acceptance of the Barro (1977) stricture that a model should not have 
“an  inefﬁciency that intelligent actors could easily avoid,” should not be   
“invoking unexplained  inefﬁciencies  in economic arrangements.” (Hall 
2005, p. 51, 56.) The Barro view is similar to the view expressed in Hahn 
(1973), “that it is a mistake to import unexplained second-best constraints 
into a model which leaves no room for their justiﬁcation.” 
I disagree with these views because they ignore the incompleteness of 
models and the role of simpliﬁcation for tractability.26 For simplicity, many 
search models have one-employee ﬁrms to simplify the analysis. Yet employ-
Diamond_lect.indd   17 2011-08-29   10:45:02328
ment is overwhelmingly in ﬁrms with two or more employees. Are we going 
to learn more from one-employee modeling by invoking considerations that 
seem plausible  in a literal one-employee environment or from involving 
considerations that seem plausible  in many-employee ﬁrms and applying 
them to the one-employee environment? It seems to me that the latter is 
more likely to yield useful insights. And the alternative of requiring analysis 
with many-employee ﬁrms will yield some new insights, but may not yield   
additional insights for some questions in return for the extra complexity 
(e.g., tracking the distribution of ﬁrm sizes), indeed may make it harder to 
ﬁnd some types of insights. Using plausible constraints seems to me to be in 
the spirit of the Marshall quote in the introduction. Model simpliﬁcation is 
done as part of “breaking up a complex question, studying one bit at a time, 
and at last combining … partial solutions.” It seems to me this works best 
when the “exact and ﬁrm handling of a narrow issue” is done in a way that ﬁts 
with the image of the “complex question” being addressed.
In many-employee ﬁrms, relations among employees are generally critical 
for productivity. And uniform compensation for similar workers in similar 
jobs is standard practice (and underlies the approach of Gertler and Trigari). 
Introducing a two-tier wage structure happens, but is not common and is a 
big deal for a ﬁrm. Thus there may not be a wage that is within the bargaining 
range for the full set of existing employees without some layoffs. And if there 
is one, it may be too high for the ﬁrm when considering new hires. If paying 
new workers less than current ones is not overall efﬁcient, then a wage 
restriction that blocks a pairwise efﬁcient hiring may not be “one that   
intelligent actors can easily avoid.” So, if you think that consistency of   
treatment of all workers is a real constraint in many-worker ﬁrms, then it 
seems right to import some implications of such a constraint while using 
the simpliﬁcation of one-employee ﬁrms.27 I think that model tractability 
sometimes makes it appropriate to assume rather than derive plausible   
conditions when one thinks the two approaches would lead to the same central   
conclusion, even though, of course, some other conclusions would not carry 
over. 
As in the retail market discussion above, consistency of treatment is a link 
between the intensive and extensive margins. Obtaining the right hours and 
effort from existing workers and attracting additional workers are separate 
concerns of an employer, both being typically addressed by the same wage 
policy.28 It seems likely that as with optimal tax theory, recognition of the 
separate roles of intensive and extensive margins would change implications 
compared to a model that recognizes only one of them.29 I am not sure 
that these considerations, simple contracts and infrequent renegotiation, 
matter a great deal for search modeling of “normal” times, but I suspect they 
matter greatly for analysis of both output and labor markets in times of high 
unemployment.30 
The literature responding to Shimer explores the implications for cyclic 
sensitivity in alternatives to the Nash bargaining solution with threat points 
calculated from not having a match. Hall and Milgrom (2008) draw on Ken 
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Binmore, Ariel Rubenstein and Asher Wolinsky (1986), which considers 
bargaining with threat points based on delay in the start of employment 
rather than giving up the match. Hall and Milgrom argue that this is more 
appropriate for continuing an existing match and show that this improves 
the Shimer calibration. For this to work for vacancy creation as well as 
layoffs, the rule needs to apply to new hires as well. Note that this preserves 
the basic assumption that ﬁrms and workers negotiate with one person at 
a time. However, at some times, some workers have multiple offers, setting 
off a competition, perhaps captured by the Bertrand solution (James 
Albrecht, Pieter A. Gautier, Susan Vroman, 2006). The large role of currently 
employed workers in ﬁlling vacancies makes this issue of prime importance 
(Nagypál, 2008, Fabien Postel-Vinay and Jean-Marc Robin, 2002). And some 
times, some ﬁrms have multiple qualiﬁed applicants as well.31 The mix 
of ﬁrms with multiple applicants (and so a lower wage) and workers with 
multiple offers (and so a higher wage) varies over the cycle. And sometimes 
wages are posted on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no bargaining available, or 
no bargaining attempted, as shown in the survey in Hall and Alan Krueger, 
(2010). Bargaining circumstances vary across ﬁrms and workers so that 
there is not a single bargaining rule that can be viewed as dominating the 
landscape of circumstances – treating all bargaining by a single rule does not 
do justice to the diversity in the economy. This suggests the need to rely on 
multiple models and not give excessive weight to one particular calibration 
when thinking about the economy.32
As noted above, a lower sensitivity to productivity changes than the Nash 
solution has been taken as a deﬁnition of a sticky wage. This is a change in 
deﬁnition from wages that do interfere with the efﬁciency of hiring and 
layoffs to wages that are less sensitive to productivity than the usual Nash 
bargain. Using the same term for two different concepts seems inappropriate 
and should not result in losing sight of the importance of layoffs and limited 
hiring because of intensive-extensive margin concerns. The impact of alter-
native wage bargaining rules on the value of vacancies is important, whether 
called a sticky wage or not, and well worth exploring. One thrust of the 
discussion above, is that reaching a conclusion on the cyclicality of wages for 
new hires is not readily done by competing calibrated models of the entire 
economy, since there are too many plausible candidates for different pieces 
of the model. That is, actual bargaining circumstances are diverse. Models 
containing just one of the set of different bargaining outcomes that exist 
can be jointly informative, but settling on just one for answering empirical 
questions seems unsatisfactory. Thus it is natural to try to get data shedding 
light directly on the reservation wages of marginal vacancies, which is the key 
variable to compare with either reservation wages (for new hires) or actual 
wages (for layoffs). 
Possible sources of transaction  information that might shed light on 
ﬁrm reservation wages are the wages of people actually hired, drawn from   
employer data or drawn from worker data. The problem is that there is a   
serious selection issue. Comparing the wages of movers and stayers from 
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worker data suffers from this particularly, since the mix of quits and layoffs 
varies so much over the business cycle. Since we expect quitters often move 
to higher wages and we expect layoffs to often be followed by a drop in 
wages, merely comparing average wage change numbers of movers and   
stayers does not seem informative, plausibly being overwhelmed by the selec-
tion issue even if made conditional on some aspects of the workers.33 That 
is, not all hires are to marginal vacancies, once we recognize heterogeneity 
in productivity, as is in more complex models. Quits directly to new employ-
ment are likely to be to non-marginal vacancies, and those will sometimes be 
created by other quits. 
Looking at the wages of new hires from ﬁrm data seems potentially more 
promising, and might allow a more forward looking calculation than just the 
current wage. One would want to compare the compensation of new hires 
at different times for the central issue – contrasting new hires and current 
employees could shed light on other issues. I note that there is a literature 
looking at data from the ﬁrm side (Marianna Kudlyak, 2010). Particularly 
interesting in the literature discussed there is the link of later pay to unem-
ployment when hired. 
My retail market analyses, in 1971 and later, assumed prices on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis, knowledge of the distribution of prices but no prior 
knowledge of which price was at which supplier. A central ﬁnding was that 
prices exceeded what would be efﬁcient. My labor market analyses preserved 
random search but assumed bargaining. They focused on the efﬁciency of 
the search process per se, and not the efﬁciency of the wages that resulted. 
There is a literature on directed search in the labor market, which is focused 
on wage determination (Espen Moen, 1997). Some of the directed search 
literature, like the earlier Robert E. Lucas and Edward C. Prescott (1974) 
modeling with separate labor markets, assumes perfect knowledge about the 
different places to search, although the outcomes after having made such a 
choice remain stochastic. Simpliﬁcation is critical for insightful modeling. 
But I think it is also important not to lose sight of the multiple elements that 
people need to use time and resources to learn and the multiple ways in 
which people do get some information, sometimes costlessly.
Analyses of sticky wages naturally consider the intensive–extensive margin 
in employment and the nature of an ongoing employment relationship. That 
such an approach is incomplete is suggested by the market for houses. The 
business cycle shows up in the market for houses in variation in the length of 
time from putting houses on the market to completing sales. Thought of as 
sticky prices in the house market, this does not involve an ongoing relation-
ship nor a similar intensive–extensive margin.
IV. BEVERIDGE CURVE
The Beveridge Curve shows the pattern of vacancies and unemployment 
over time. In economically good times we expect lots of vacancies and low   
unemployment, with bad times showing fewer vacancies and more unemploy- 
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ment. In the course of a business cycle, a movement from good times to bad 
and back again, we expect to see a loop around a curve, as shows up in a   
differential equation setting of a basic search model.34 
Figure 4 shows the empirical Beveridge curve for the US for the decade 
up to August 2010, with the open circles, connected by lines, for 2008–2010. 
Until the last 12 months in the ﬁgure, you can see the expected pattern of 
a recession, as vacancies shrink and unemployment rises, moving southeast 
roughly along a curve. Since then, we have had a rise in vacancies without 
a fall in unemployment.35 With rising vacancies and stable high unemploy-
ment, we are hearing claims that the US has just had a leap in structural 
unemployment – that the economy may have a long-term higher level of 
unemployment as the “new normal.” This inference is taken to imply that 
we should not be so concerned with stimulating aggregate demand through 
monetary and ﬁscal policies. For example, here is an August 17, 2010 
statement by Narayana Kocherlakota, President of the Minneapolis Federal 
Reserve Bank. 
Figure 4. Beveridge Curve, United States, December 2000–August 2010. 
Source: Robert Shimer, personal correspondence.
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What does this change in the relationship between job openings and unem-
ployment connote? In a word, mismatch. Firms have jobs, but can’t ﬁnd 
appropriate workers. The workers want to work, but can’t ﬁnd appropri-
ate jobs. There are many possible sources of mismatch – geography, skills,  
demography – and they are probably all at work. Whatever the source, 
though, it is hard to see how the Fed can do much to cure this problem. 
Monetary stimulus has provided conditions so that manufacturing plants 
want to hire new workers. But the Fed does not have a means to transform 
construction workers into manufacturing workers.
This statement has set off a ﬂurry of reactions, to which I will add.
There is no surprise that we are hearing claims of higher structural unem-
ployment – such statements appear when unemployment is high. A similar 
debate unfolded as I was a new student of economics. And in 1964, Bob 
Solow devoted his Wicksell Lectures to rebutting claims that the high unem-
ployment in the late ‘50s and early ‘60s was structural rather than a result of 
inadequate aggregate demand. Indeed there is a long history of claims that 
the latest technological or structural developments make for a new long-term 
high level of unemployment, but these have repeatedly been proven wrong 
(Gregoryg R. Woirol, 1996).36 
It is likely to be more informative to think about the state of the labor market 
by focusing on the matching function, relating hires to unemployment and 
vacancies, rather than the Beveridge curve, which only considers the latter 
two. The natural interpretation is that the Beveridge curve movements would 
Figure 5. Vacancy Yield, measured as H(t)/V(t – 1) January 2001–September 2010. Source: 
Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger, work in progress.
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appear as a decrease in the efﬁciency of matching workers and jobs. Figure 5 
shows the ratio of hires to vacancies over the last decade. Consistent with the 
picture from the Beveridge curve, over the last year we have had a drop in 
the rate of hiring relative to vacancies even though unemployment has stayed 
steady – a drop in the level of the matching function.
Note Kocherlakota’s statement that “Firms have jobs, but can’t ﬁnd appro-
priate workers. The workers want to work, but can’t ﬁnd appropriate jobs.” 
This is a static view of the labor market that does not make sense when think-
ing of the millions of hires that happen each month. While many workers, 
far too many workers, remain unemployed for a long time, many workers are 
ﬁnding jobs and many vacancies are being ﬁlled. Figure 1 shows that over the 
last two decades, on average, 37 percent of unemployed found employment 
each month. That percentage has dropped, but is still roughly 20 percent. 
Moreover, the large increase in the number of unemployed roughly offsets 
the fall in the exit rate, leaving monthly hires at a similar level to before – for 
the 12 months from November 2009 to October 2010, 5.7 million workers 
found a job per month, not hugely different from the 6 million average over 
the last 20 years. So we still have to think about large ﬂows into and out of 
employment. 
The matching function is not a technologically given structural relation-
ship. Rather it is a reﬂection at the aggregate level of a complex and varied 
pattern of hiring at the level of individual employers and workers. Thus it is 
useful to examine some of the details at a less aggregative level to see how 
the current slump might be affecting the aggregate relationship – empirically 
we are outside the range of values of the ratio of vacancies to unemployment 
that were used in most estimates of the matching function. That is, a key 
question for interpreting the data in this recession and recovery compared 
to earlier ones is how the pattern of hires, unemployment and vacancies is 
different in recessions of different sizes and also different because of speciﬁc 
events, such as the large and continuing issues in both banking and housing 
markets.
Figure 6. Unemployed Persons by Duration of Unemployment, Percent Distribution 
(Not Seasonally Adjusted) Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release, 
November 5, 2010, Table A-12.
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The severity of the current recession in both depth and length has resulted 
in a great deal of long-term unemployment. Figure 6 shows the distributions 
of unemployment durations as of October 2010 and a year earlier, October 
2009, before the Beveridge curve started moving vertically. The low   
vacancies we experienced raised long-term unemployment. In addition, we 
have had extended unemployment beneﬁts. Such beneﬁts somewhat reduce 
job search efforts and also discourage movement out of the labor force. Any 
lowering of the job search effort of the long-term unemployed is not likely 
to have much effect on aggregate unemployment, as there are many other 
workers who are seeking jobs and relatively few vacancies. And a reduction in 
the ﬂow of unemployed out of the labor force increases measured unemploy-
ment, while having little effect on hiring, both because of the large numbers 
of remaining unemployed and because those outside the labor force take 
jobs as well. Reducing the ﬂow of unemployed out of the labor force shifts 
the Beveridge curve up and the measured matching function down as hires 
divided by the number of unemployed is lower because the denominator is 
higher. 37 
Long-term unemployment is very hard on the workers experiencing it and 
on their families. Moreover, over time, extended durations of unemployment 
affect behavior – the long-term unemployed are less good at maintaining 
their connection to employment and so we may have a slower-responding 
labor force after the economy grows signiﬁcantly, which may be relevant 
for inﬂation concerns once we are nearing full employment, but not now. 
The deleterious effects of long-term unemployment are a reason to be 
particularly concerned about how long the economy does badly. Historically, 
recovery is slow after ﬁnancial crises. The impact of a slow recovery on the 
long-term unemployed emphasizes the importance of stimulating aggregate 
demand enough to speed up recovery. And it emphasizes the importance of 
experimenting with programs to help the long-term unemployed ﬁnd and 
hold jobs. 
Just as measured unemployment does not fully reﬂect the availability of 
workers to be hired, so too the measured level of vacancies does not fully 
reﬂect the availability of jobs. Some hiring is done by ﬁrms that do not have 
measured vacancies, with some of these happening at ﬁrms that hire without 
posted vacancies, and some at ﬁrms that ﬁll posted vacancies too quickly to 
be picked up in the data. John Haltiwanger provided me an estimate that 
about 40 percent of hires in the raw data are associated with establishments 
that begin the month with zero vacancies; with an estimated two-thirds due 
to the timing issue and the rest due to hiring without posting. Thus, measure-
ment of the aggregate matching function may well vary with shifts in the 
makeup of hiring. 
On a cross-section basis, the speed of hiring varies widely in systematic ways 
(Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger, 2010). There are large differences across 
industries, with construction having a very high ratio of hires to vacancies, 
compared to industries like education and health. While generally cyclically 
sensitive, construction has been particularly hard hit this recession, which 
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would lower the measured efﬁciency of the matching function compared 
with a time with a smaller relative impact on construction. Establishments 
that are growing fast ﬁll vacancies much more quickly than those growing 
more slowly. I do not know of data, but there may be a larger change in 
the mix of vacancies at fast and slow growing ﬁrms in this slump compared 
with smaller and less prolonged periods of high unemployment. Small ﬁrms 
are much more likely to hire without measured vacancies than large ﬁrms. 
Giuseppe Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010) report on the relative roles of 
large and small ﬁrms over the business cycle. Moscarini reports that gross job 
creation by large ﬁrms minus that by small ﬁrms has been unusually high, 
more so than in the other recoveries since 1980. This is consistent with a 
differential impact of credit market changes on ﬁrms of different size that 
seems to be happening.38 The drop in house values has also impacted the 
ability of small ﬁrms to ﬁnance hiring by borrowing against the houses of the 
ﬁrm owners. The resulting smaller share of hiring by small ﬁrms lowers the 
measured matching function. Some types of positions are ﬁlled much more 
readily and rapidly than others. Hall (2010) has suggested that positions that 
a ﬁrm wants to ﬁll after a quit are ﬁlled more quickly than newly created 
positions because quits are most likely to occur in high-turnover jobs with low 
and generic skills, such as fast-food restaurants.39 And of course quits are way 
down, possibly reducing the average speed of ﬁlling jobs. 
A key question for interpreting the pattern of aggregate unemployment 
and vacancy rates in this recession and recovery compared to earlier ones is 
whether the prime difference is in a changed difﬁculty of hiring at the disag-
gregated level or from a changed mix of diverse, but basically unchanged, 
hiring patterns across different ﬁrms and sectors, given that this is such a 
large and prolonged slump and with large and continuing issues in both the 
capital and housing markets. Complementing this analysis of hiring on a 
disaggregated basis is consideration of what Kocherlakota’s assertion would 
suggest might be found. Is there really a widespread difﬁculty in hiring in 
some industries or locations? I have not seen such reports.40 Thus we may 
be having shifts in the Beveridge Curve and the matching function that do 
not signal change for the underlying functioning of the economy once a 
recovery is well-established. That is, the pattern would return to normal after 
a sufﬁcient rise in aggregate demand, apart from the lingering effects of 
long-term unemployment. 
Having looked at the data, let me now look at possible policy inferences 
from whatever shifts may still be there. First, whatever one’s view on the 
magnitude of recent slippage in matching efﬁciency, more education, better 
education, good retraining all make for a more productive labor force and, 
done well at a reasonable cost, are policies to pursue. And carefully evaluated 
experiments in helping the long-term unemployed get and hold jobs seem 
likely to be worthwhile. Indeed a time of high unemployment is likely to be 
a time when further education is less socially costly by using time that would 
otherwise not be so well spent. The policy debate is not about whether to do 
more on the structural side; it is about what to do on the aggregate demand 
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side, which is particularly an issue now with concern about projected long-run 
debt levels. 
Second, for the current moment, the argument about the aggregate   
demand side  is academic,  in the negative sense of the word. Current   
estimates I have seen of how much of the increase in unemployment from 
a few years ago is  “structural,” rather than due to inadequate aggregate 
demand, still leaves enough need for aggregate demand stimulation that it is 
clear what direction is needed for further policies. 
Third, I am skeptical of the value of attempting to separate cyclical 
from structural unemployment over a business cycle. When ﬁrms evaluate 
candidates for positions, they consider the quality of the match of available 
candidates, projections of the availability of new candidates, and the value to 
the ﬁrm of ﬁlling the slot. That is, the willingness to hire for a given quality of 
match depends on expectations about the proﬁtability of investing in a new 
worker and about the likely pool of future applicants. 
The tighter the labor market and the more valuable the ﬁlling of a vacancy, 
the more a ﬁrm is willing to hire a worker who is a less good match, who 
may need more training. In other words, a worker who might be viewed as   
structurally unemployed, as facing serious mismatch  in the current state 
of the economy, may be readily employable in a tight labor market. The 
common practice of thinking about the extent of unemployment as a sum of   
frictional, structural and cyclical parts misses the point that the tightness of 
the labor market affects worker quitting decisions and affects employers’ 
willingnesses to hire an applicant who needs more training. Insofar as direct 
measures of frictional or structural unemplyment are dependent on the 
tightness of the labor market, they have limited relevance for the design 
of demand stimulation policies. The idea that the U.S. economy is not   
adaptable and capable of dealing with the need for skills and jobs to adapt 
to each other is peculiar, given the long history of unemployment going up 
and down.41 
When the labor market is tight and ﬁrms have trouble ﬁnding workers, 
they reach out to places they have not looked before and extend training in 
order to ﬁnd workers who can ﬁll their needs. Supporting current stimulus 
policies as very good for the economy is entirely compatible with taking care 
to avoid future inﬂation.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Having been away from this topic for a long time, I was surprised during 
my crash course in search analysis this fall at what a long way search has 
come since its early days. Without the high quality work using a search-based   
approach of many researchers, it is safe to say there would not have been a 
prize recognizing the analysis of markets with search frictions. And the work 
is far from done. For addressing unemployment, there are clear needs to   
incorporate credit markets and (non-Walrasian) output markets and to   
include nominal thinking and nominal contracting as well as a larger role 
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for current income. Filling such needs would better place partial equilibrium 
search analyses of the labor market in a full general equilibrium setting. 
Indeed, this essay has stressed the importance of not treating a partial equi-
librium model as if it were a satisfactory general equilibrium model. 
More  inclusive modeling aside, I want to reiterate the perspective of 
Marshall quoted at the start. Understanding of the economy, and policy 
recommendations and decisions, should reﬂect analysis through multiple 
models. And they should incorporate insights that seem right even though 
they have not yet been modeled. 
ENDNOTES
1) This is a longer version of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel lecture given December 8, 2010. I am grateful for help with interpretation of the literature 
and comments on drafts from George Akerlof, Jim Albrecht, Nick Barr, Olivier Blanchard, Jesse 
Bump, Ken Burdett, Steve Davis, Angus Deaton, Bill Dickens, Burcu Duygan-Bump, Glenn Ellison, 
Michael Elsby, Laura Feiveson, Ben Friedman, Bob Hall, John Haltiwanger, Bengt Holmström, 
Frank Levy, Greg Leiserson, Eric Maskin, Dan McFadden, Matt Mitchell, Dale Mortensen, Giuseppe 
Moscarini, Mike Piore, Mike Rothschild, Rob Shimer, Jenny Simon, Kathy Swartz, Peter Temin, 
Susan Vroman, Ivan Werning, Janet Yellen, and Joel Yellin.
2)  For a survey, see Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright, 2005. My citations in the literature primarily 
reﬂect my memory of papers that particularly inﬂuenced my research, as well as recent articles that 
have stimulated a response from me. Having stopped work on search 15 years ago, having shifted 
my focus to pensions, my awareness of the current literature is limited, although I have enjoyed 
catching up somewhat. 
3)  The need for equilibrium analyses was stressed in Rothschild, 1973.
4) Formal  modeling is readily done assuming shoppers know the distribution of prices, but not which 
price is charged at which store. While convenient, this is an unrealistic picture of what people know. 
People do not know the distribution of prices and often have been given some partial information 
about relative prices, from others and from store reputations. Conventional modeling of both 
random search and directed search straddle plausible information ﬂows.
5 Earlier, my dissatisfaction with the completeness of markets assumed in Arrow-Debreu theory led 
me to explore alternative incomplete allocation mechanisms. My search over mechanisms did not 
last long, as I settled quickly on a model of a stock market, with a limit on allowable trades from 
the set of existing stocks, which were assumed not to be rich enough to span the space of possible 
outcomes. To analyze efﬁciency I took the bases of the limits on market outcomes to also limit how 
the government can affect resource allocation, an approach that has also been taken in search 
theory. While the simple, basically one-period model I constructed in 1967, showed efﬁciency of the 
market, I was aware that having a single period was special. Later work, incorporating more periods, 
showed that generically the private allocation is inefﬁcient, quite a contrast to the efﬁciency with 
complete markets (Hart, 1975, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986). For broader discussion of 
my research motivations and the diversity of ways I came to work on different topics, see Moscarini 
and Wright, 2007 and Diamond, forthcoming.
6)  Burdett and Judd, 1983, clariﬁed the link between information patterns and the type of equilibrium 
that occurs. Wage dispersion for similar workers has been a signiﬁcant topic (Mortensen, 2003). 
Presumably similar underlying mathematical structures are involved as in the retail price literature, 
although the citations across literatures appear limited.
7) Not  surprisingly, studies of the impact of the low search costs when using the Internet have been an 
interesting part of the search literature. 
8)  In Arrow-Debreu theory subjective probabilities are part of preferences, which are respected in 
normative evaluations. W ith consumers searching across stores with different marginal costs 
without knowing the distribution of prices, I examined the socially optimal prices in the stores, 
evaluated with the correct distribution of prices. I found three reasons for the optimum to differ 
from marginal cost pricing – non-optimal stopping rules, mistaken consumer prior beliefs on the 
distribution of prices, and correct prior beliefs that are then revised based on observed prices.
9) Rogerson,  Shimer and Wright, 2005, discuss the differences in models with wage posting and 
wage bargaining. As they state, the differences across the models also depend on the nature of 
information ﬂows (typically modeled as random search in bargaining models and as directed 
search in price posting models). Paralleling the retail market literature with the dependence of 
prices on the nature of information ﬂows, I suspect that with multiple sources of information ﬂow 
(and reputations for hard and soft bargaining) the differences between the two approaches would 
not be large. In any event, Hall and Alan Krueger, 2010, note that posting and bargaining (and 
bargaining within posting) are all widespread in the U.S. today. Firms with nonnegotiable wage 
schedules may bargain on the title given to a worker when wages vary with title, which supposedly 
reﬂects duties or experience, but may be somewhat ﬂexible.
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10) The estimate is for 1994 and 1996–2003 (Bruce Fallick and Charles A. Fleischman, 2004).
11) Dates for the averaging vary by country depending on data availability.
12) According to calculations for a subsample of these countries, drawn from multiple sources and 
provided to me by Elsby, Hobijn and ùahin, the fraction of unemployment outﬂows that become 
employed is lowest in the U.S. (at 53 percent), but this ﬁgure does not appear to be a large outlier: 
analogous numbers for the other countries for which they could ﬁnd estimates hover between 55 
and 60 percent.
13) Much of the literature simpliﬁes matters greatly by assuming risk neutral workers and employers, 
all having the same discount rate. Of course, one can not do justice to insurance in such a context, 
and happily, the literature has developed to include both risk aversion and savings (e. g., Acemoglu 
and Shimer, 1999). 
14) Experience rating the taxes that ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts also inﬂuences the behavior of 
ﬁrms.
15) Friedman, 1968, p. 8 deﬁned the natural rate of unemployment as: “The “natural the rate of 
unemployment,” in other words, is the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system 
of general equilibrium equations, provided there is  imbedded  in them the actual structural 
characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including market imperfections, stochastic 
variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and 
labor availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so on. Footnote: It is perhaps worth noting that this 
“natural” rate need not correspond to equality between the number unemployed and the number 
of job vacancies. For any given structure of the labor market, there will be some equilibrium relation 
between these two magnitudes, but there is no reason why it should be one of equality.” 
16) For an extensive discussion of the matching function, see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001.
17) And possibly quits and layoffs triggered by new hires as in Diamond and Maskin, 1979, 1981.
18) An urn-ball model sees job applications as balls being tossed in a randomized way into urns, 
representing vacancies awaiting applications. See for example, Olivier Jean Blanchard and 
Diamond, 1994.
19) Insofar as contracted production is for other ﬁrms who base their demand on anticipated sales, the 
same considerations hold.
20) Furthermore, the Arrow-Debreu model has no budget constraints on investment (beyond the need 
to break even). But investment is more sensitive to cash ﬂows than is consistent with that model 
(Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988). 
21) The model did not allow for trade credit, something I analyzed in a 1990 paper. The ability to 
extend credit alters the workings of the model, but, not surprisingly, does not change the basic 
qualitative ﬁndings.
22) Moreover, with only self-employment, the division of output between employer and employee also 
plays no role.
23) I raised the issue of policies that affect both allocation and stabilization in 1994a. Another example 
is that marginal tax rates are part of the equity-efﬁciency tradeoff in normal times and part of built-
in stabilizers for times of high unemployment.
24) And rational expectations ignores the systematic errors in stochastic thinking that are the focus 
of behavioral economics as well as differences in prior beliefs, which contribute to diversity in 
expectations at a point of time.
25) Prices and wages do change frequently in economies with hyperinﬂation.
26) Of course, one could pretend to derive constraints by invoking an underlying consideration that 
leads directly to a restriction one might have simply imposed. An example, in some tax analyses, 
is to invoke an observability constraint to restrict the available choices of tax base. Even though all 
candidate bases have some cost and some inaccuracy, they are labeled either costlessly and perfectly 
available or simply technically unavailable.
27) A similar issue arises in optimal taxation – whether to formally model the complications that come 
from high complexity of a tax structure when selecting a tax base or to more simply merely rule 
out some complex tax structures before optimizing. For more discussion of methodology see James 
Banks and Diamond, 2010.
28) Also relevant, as identiﬁed in the literature on asymmetric information and the assignment of 
decision-making is the inability to settle the arrangements for the rest of the employment period at 
the start. 
29) Contrast Mirrlees, 1971 with Diamond, 1980 and Saez, 2002.
30) While written with an eye on unions, some of the considerations in Hall and David M. Lilien, 1979, 
seem to me relevant in non-union settings as well.
31) For models with multiple simultaneous offers, see Elliott, 2011 and the papers cited there.
32) For models with bargaining with asymmetric information, see Brügemann and Moscarini, 2010, 
and the papers cited there.
33) Also relevant is the varying mix of job opportunities over the business cycle (Wayne Vroman, 1977, 
1978).
34) See, for example, Figure 3 in Blanchard and Diamond (1989) which shows the dynamic path 
moving from a steady state with poor opportunities to a steady state with good ones. 
35) Taking a longer time horizon, the curve around which a business cycle moves has shown shifts over 
time.
36) For example, consider this 1931 statement: “the real issue is not whether technological displacement 
causes workers to lose their jobs. It undoubtedly does. The real issue is whether over a period of 
years the continual introduction of new and improved machines and processes is causing a total net 
increase or decrease in mass employment. … On this issue there are two opposing points of view, 
each held by large numbers of earnest people.”
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 U .S. Senate, Select Committee on Unemployment insurance, Unemployment Insurance, Part 2, 
“Report of the Committee on Technological Unemployment to the Secretary of Labor,” November 
1931, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, 1931, 560. Cited in Woirol, 1996, p. 36.
37) If someone constructed a measure of those outside the labor force who have a signiﬁcant probability 
of becoming employed, one could analyze a three-argument matching function. 
38) Bernanke, 2010, p. 4, notes: “The availability of credit to ﬁnance investment and expand business 
operations remains quite uneven: Generally speaking, large ﬁrms in good ﬁnancial condition can 
obtain credit in capital markets easily and on favorable terms. Larger ﬁrms also hold considerable 
amounts of cash on their balance sheets. By contrast, surveys and anecdotes indicate that bank-
dependent smaller ﬁrms continue to face signiﬁcantly greater problems in obtaining credit, 
reﬂecting in part weaker balance sheets and income prospects that limit their ability to qualify for 
loans as well as tight lending standards and terms on the part of banks.” 
39) This is consistent with the ﬁnding in Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger, 2010, that the job-ﬁlling 
rate rises with the worker turnover rate.
40) Dickens, 2010 p. 10, notes: “Figure 3 presents the ratio of vacancies to unemployment in 8 different 
industries. While it is possible to discern the increase in vacancies over recent months in some 
industries, the ratio remains substantially depressed in all industries. What we do not see is any 
industries with high vacancy unemployment ratios. This suggests that it would be hard to make a 
case for structural mismatch being a major problem today.” In personal correspondence, he reports 
on ongoing work with Bob Trieste that looked at geographic mismatch indices based on both the 
JOLTS and the Conference Board’s new help wanted on line data. They explored occupational 
mismatch, geographic mismatch at a much more detailed level than in the original paper, and 
industry mismatch. None show any evidence of increasing mismatch coincident with the apparent 
outward shift in the Beveridge Curve. Regis Barnichon, Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and AyúegĦl 
ùahin (2010) “decompose the recent deviation from the Beveridge curve … [and] ﬁnd that most 
of the current deviation from the Beveridge curve can be attributed to a shortfall in … hires 
per vacancy. This shortfall is broad-based across all industries and is particularly pronounced in 
construction, transportation, trade, and utilities, and leisure and hospitality. Construction alone 
accounts for more than a third of the Beveridge curve gap.” P 1.
41) A basically static perception of the economy that ﬁts with a perception of structural unemployment 
that is not helped by aggregate demand policies is akin to the badly mistaken idea that policies that 
encourage a high rate of early retirement will be helpful for youth unemployment on a sustained 
basis (Diamond, 2006, Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise, 2010).
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